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ABSTRACT 
ELIZABETH L. BROWN  
Regionalism and Reform: The Consequences of Consociationalism in Belgium 
(Under the direction of Dr. Susan Allen) 
With the success of the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), a Flemish regionalist party, in 
recent federal and regional elections, the continued role of regionalism in Belgian politics 
has been made clear. This has occurred despite significant efforts by Belgian politicians 
to counteract this tendency. By analyzing the impact of the six state reforms that have 
drastically affected the political system within the country, this paper outlines how the 
reforms themselves have unintentionally incentivized the political parties to pursue 
regionalism as a winning political strategy, which laid the groundwork for the current 
success of the N-VA. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates how the institutional system 
known as consociationalism has been unable to implement the moderating tendency that 
it seeks to provide in the Belgian case and has instead contributed to stagnation in the 
federal parliament and to a centrifugal pull of the parties into separate linguistic 
communities. In examining this, the paper makes use of the devolutionary framework 
proposed by Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Nicholas Gill (2002) to show how the reforms 
have impacted the legitimacy of the subnational governments.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In 1970, rising tension between Flemings and Walloons, the two major 
ethnolinguistic groups in Belgium, led to a series of reforms aimed at better representing 
the needs of these two groups. This process slowly transformed the country from a 
unitary state to a federal state and cemented representation based on language. Leaders 
hoped that these changes would quell the divisions between the groups and return 
stability to the government. Instead, continual calls for additional reforms to shift the 
power towards the Communities and Regions have become the norm and regionalist 
parties continue to play an important role. The largest political party in Belgium, the 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance/N-VA), advocates for an eventual 
termination of the Belgian state with the rise of an independent Flanders. The reforms 
have objectively failed to accomplish their goal of quelling the divide. Thus, this paper 
seeks to explain the continued importance of the ethnolinguistic divide and the strength 
of regionalist parties despite the efforts of the past six state reforms to pacify these 
problems. 
 The situation in Belgium reflects the predicament faced by many countries that 
lack ethnic homogeneity. Such countries face a challenge in ensuring that their diverse 
group of citizens believe that their system of government properly represents them. As a 
result, many of these societies, known as plural societies, are fraught with instability and 
violence.1 This problem is especially common when these countries are democracies, 
since the legitimacy of a democracy is partially grounded on the idea of representation. 
As a result, the exclusion of segments of the population directly undermines the 
                                                 
1 Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability 
(Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), 21. 
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legitimacy of that government. Thus, democracies in plural societies must find a way to 
ensure the stability of their system by addressing this concern. Countries that are 
attempting to democratize may try to emulate the model of other countries that seem to 
overcome the violence that often accompanies pluralism. Belgium is cited as an example 
of such a country due to its extensive history of pluralism with limited political violence. 
It is for this reason that the emergence of a secessionist movement in Flanders is 
particularly noteworthy. The rise of regionalism demonstrates the challenges of finding a 
suitable and stable system of government for plural societies, even without the presence 
of violence.    
The particular model in place in Belgium falls under a design known as 
consociationalism, whose very goal is to mitigate the role of extremist tendencies, such as 
secessionist groups. Consociationalism attempts to provide successful, stable democracy 
through its power-sharing structure that encourages compromise among political leaders. 
Despite Belgium’s historical practice of consociationalism, the prevalence of separatism 
continues, indicating a failure, at least in part, of the institutional design. For critics of the 
consociational structure, who contend that consociationalism often aggravates the very 
divisions it hopes to counteract, the strength of the N-VA represents a natural 
consequence of the implementation of the institutional system in a plural society.  
 This paper analyzes the situation of regionalism in Belgium as affected by the 
reforms and seeks to see if the resurgence of the regionalist parties represents the 
realization of the detrimental aspects of consociationalism. My hypothesis is that the 
reform process itself had the unintended consequence of shifting the focus from the 
national level to the subnational level, which has helped to legitimize the notion of 
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Flanders and Wallonia functioning as two separate nations. The reforms have created 
essentially separate political systems. Political parties compete only within their own 
region and have no incentive to appeal to Belgians in general. This division of the 
electorate reduces the negative consequences of using divisive regionalist rhetoric that 
pits Flanders against Wallonia and encourages prioritizing matters that benefit their half 
of the country to the detriment of the efficiency of the national government. As no major 
party operates at the national level, politicians in Flanders face limited consequences for 
failing to cooperate with those from Wallonia and vice versa, and the traditional parties, 
which historically worked together, have lost influence. Furthermore, the installation of 
regional and community parliaments that have vast powers increases the credibility of the 
idea of a separate Flanders and Wallonia. 
 To understand the connection between the reforms and the Belgian political 
system, this paper makes use of a devolutionary framework proposed by Andrés 
Rodríguez-Pose and Nicholas Gill (2002). This framework links devolution with the 
legitimacy held by the national and subnational government. This aspect of legitimacy is 
important because a consociational system aims to increase the national legitimacy at the 
expense of the subnational. If the consociational structure, as implemented in Belgium, 
does indeed increase the legitimacy of the subnational government over that of the 
national, it would seem unlikely that such a system can weaken regionalism.  
 Chapter two further outlines and explains the concept of consociationalism and 
the devolutionary framework. Chapter three provides a historical context of regionalism 
in Belgium from its founding and presents the constitutional reforms as they relate to 
changes in the institutional structure of the nation. Chapter four draws the theoretical 
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concepts of chapter two together with the case of regionalism in Belgium. It looks at the 
effect of the reforms on the legitimacy of the subnational government by analyzing the 
strength of the regionalist parties and regionalism within the traditional parties, shifts in 
public opinion, and their role in shaping later reforms. Chapter five discusses how the 
reforms have changed the incentives for the political parties, particularly as it pertains to 
encouraging accommodation and moderation. Chapter six provides concluding remarks.   
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CHAPTER 2: OVERCOMING THE PLURAL SOCIETY DILEMMA 
 The political unrest often faced by ethnically heterogeneous societies has been the 
subject of much discussion. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) outline the underlying causes 
of instability in plural societies and present a pessimistic forecast for efforts to establish 
long-term regime stability. Lijphart and Horowitz have instead focused on potential 
solutions to this dilemma by proposing institutional frameworks designed to address the 
segmentation of plural societies. Their solutions, known as consociationalism and 
centripetalism, respectively, seek to address conflict between different identity groups 
within a society, but disagree on the way to encourage politicians from these groups to 
work together to overcome this divide.  
 
2.1 Identity Theories 
 The issue at the forefront for a plural society is one of identity, namely that such a 
society must contend with subnational identities with enough salience to challenge the 
national one. The question then becomes why identity matters, as an individual’s 
association with a certain subnational group does not on its own automatically cause a 
breakdown in national stability. For theorists who study the interaction between identity 
and politics, much of the importance of identity lies in its salience and the ability of the 
politicians to use this identity to advance their goals. 
Social identity theory looks at how people categorize themselves and others based 
on various identifiers, such as ethnicity, language, and political affiliation. In general, the 
theory argues that high-status groups are more likely to formulate a group identifier 
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because “membership positively distinguishes group members from outsiders.”2 Low-
status groups will focus on positive attributes of their group or fight against the negative 
image.3 In his overview of social identity theory, Michael Hogg (2016) argues that 
politicians capitalize on these aspects to further their political goals, especially if they are 
seen as fitting the general image, or prototype, of a group member.4 Hogg suggests that a 
potentially successful way of bridging the divide between groups is to create a cross-
categorization in which the existing group identity is complemented by an overarching 
identity shared on other dimensions between the in-group and out-group.5  
 
2.2 Stability in Plural Societies  
A key characteristic of plural societies is deep divisions between various groups, 
typically along ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines. These cleavages frequently lead to 
political violence or instability by challenging the legitimacy of the state through their 
competition with nationality to serve as the primary identification for an individual.6 
Politicians, seeking to gain a basis of support in a plural society, realize that the identities 
behind the divisions are highly salient and provide fertile grounds for organizing. As a 
result, political parties in plural societies are commonly based on identity groups.7 This 
leads to a problem known as ethnic outbidding, in which politicians vie for votes on the 
                                                 
2 Leonie Huddy, “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory,” 
Political Psychology 22, no. 1 (March 2001), 134. 
3 Ibid., 134-135. 
4 Michael A. Hogg, “Social Identity Theory,” In Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social Identity 
Theory: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. Shelley McKeown, Reeshma Haji, and Neil Ferguson (Cham: 
Springer 2016), 11. 
5 Ibid., 8.  
6 Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability, 8.  
7 Henry Jarrett, “Consociationalism and Identity in Ethnically Divided Societies: Northern Ireland and 
Malaysia,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 16, no. 3 (2016), 401. 
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basis of ethnic identity and moderate views are seen as counterproductive since one 
cannot hope to obtain votes outside of the group to account for lost radical votes.8  
Political competition in a country plagued by ethnic outbidding becomes 
inseparable from conflict between the various groups. Majoritarian democracy often 
aggravates this tendency by creating a winner-take-all system in which the losing groups 
are shut out of power, thereby significantly raising the costs of failing to win, given the 
fear of a tyrannical or suppressive majority. Even without this extreme, losing prevents 
minority groups from obtaining their goals. Thus, the system pits the identity groups 
against each other. 
Once this process of ethnic outbidding begins, it often reinforces itself. The 
different segmental groups move further apart and turn towards increasingly extreme 
positions. Eventually, the political situation in such societies becomes untenable and 
stability collapses. Given this bleak forecast for democratic governance in plural 
societies, some have questioned whether it is possible for such a society to maintain a 
stable democracy. While pessimism remains the norm, two main institutional designs 
have been proposed as potential solutions to the plural society dilemma: 
consociationalism and centripetalism.   
 
2.3 Consociationalism 
 Consociationalism, as defined by Arend Lijphart, in its democratic form, is a four-
part institutional structure designed to promote power-sharing. The key components are: 
                                                 
8 Christina Isabel Zuber and Edina Szöcsik, “Ethnic Outbidding and Nested Competition: Explaining the 
Extremism of Ethnonational Minority Parties in Europe,” European Journal of Political Research 54 
(2015), 786-787.  
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(1) the existence of a grand coalition of political leaders, (2) a mutual veto, (3) 
proportional representation, and (4) autonomy for the various groups over their internal 
affairs.9  
The first characteristic refers to a system, likely parliamentary in nature, in which 
elites from various segments of the populations govern together. Lijphart distinguishes a 
grand coalition from a typical parliamentary cabinet by noting that the former requires an 
overwhelming majority of parties to participate in the government. 10 In contrast, the 
latter can have a significant number of parties in the opposition.11 The mutual veto serves 
to protect minorities by preventing the majority from taking actions that violate the vital 
interests of the minority.12 Proportionality extends beyond simple allocation of seats in 
the legislative body and the cabinet to all civil service appointments, in an effort to 
prevent the disproportionate allocation of resources.13 It also helps to reinforce the goal of 
the grand coalition by guaranteeing representation in the government for all populations. 
Thus, it is not feasible to form a coalition that excludes that segment. Autonomy provides 
each group decision-making powers over issues that fall solely under the group’s 
purview. This can take different forms, including a federalized structure, though Lijphart 
does not deem federalism to be a necessary element of consociationalism.14 The goal of 
this segmental autonomy is to reduce the number of issues that bring the groups into 
conflict by giving them power over issues considered to likely create tensions, such as 
education or language policy. Through these features, in a consociational system, any 
                                                 
9 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977), 25. 
10 Ibid., 25-26. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 36-37. 
13 Ibid., 39. 
14 Ibid., 41. 
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issues that must be decided among the entire population are decided by elites 
representing each segment of the whole populace, while those that are limited to a 
community are placed solely under that community’s control.15 
 In addition to the required features outlined in the previous paragraph, there are 
various factors that are beneficial in establishing and maintaining a stable consociational 
democracy in plural societies. These include overarching loyalties beyond the subnational 
divisions, isolation of the segments, a history of elites working together to accommodate 
the interests of different populations, and the existence of cross-cutting cleavages.16 
Furthermore, the balance of power between the different groups is also important. 
Equally-sized populations are more likely to create a cooperative system, while a 
numerical imbalance would instead tempt the larger group to disregard the interests of the 
smaller one.17  
Proponents of consociationalism argue that this system provides stability by 
helping to moderate radical tendencies. They point to the grand coalition as a method that 
allows for politicians who would otherwise be extremists to work within the system to 
address their grievances and argue that participation in government helps to promote the 
more moderate members within extremist groups.18 By prioritizing accommodation, 
consociationalism promotes a culture of cooperation among elites, which is expected to 
lead to reduced tension and divisions between the social identities and to turn the 
attention of the political system towards the typical political divisions of non-plural 
                                                 
15 Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps, “Combining Federalism with Consociationalism: Is Belgian 
Consociational Federalism Digging its Own Grave?” Ethnopolitics 14, no. 3 (2015), 279-280. 
16 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 54. 
17 Ibid., 56. 
18 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland’s Conflict, and its 
Agreement 2. What Critics of Consociation Can Learn from Northern Ireland,” Government and 
Opposition 41, no. 2 (March 2006), 262. 
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societies of disagreements over socio-economic policies.19 Furthermore, with each 
segment of the population guaranteed representation, a consociational system is expected 
to reduce the tendency for ethnic outbidding and the rallying around ethnic politics.  
Consociationalists maintain that divisions based on identity are often too difficult to 
overcome by the creation of a transcending identity. They argue that the installation of 
the consociational structure mitigates the salience of these identities, which allows for the 
society and political system to move beyond them and for a shared identity to be 
obtained.20 This shared identity would serve as an overarching loyalty, encourage elite 
accommodation, and provide additional ties between the subnational groups.  
 Critics of consociationalism point to several aspects of its institutional structure as 
counterproductive to its goals. First, it advocates for the inclusion of all significant 
groups, in hopes of encouraging moderation, and ultimately relies on this moderation to 
achieve its aims. In the case in which a significant grouping within a country is made up 
of radicals, consociationalism would require the inclusion of that group in the belief that 
their participation in government will serve as “a powerful stimulus to moderation and 
compromise.”21 This tempering of positions may not take place. The extremists in power 
may continue to push for policies that are unacceptable to others. Consociationalists also 
promote an elitist system with the idea that political elites are likely to be more moderate 
or accommodating than the public as a whole. Furthermore, it continues to emphasize the 
role of the divisions in society through both its representational structure and its focus on 
                                                 
19 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland’s Conflict, and its 
Agreement 2. What Critics of Consociation Can Learn from Northern Ireland,” 275-276. 
20 Henry Jarrett, “Consociationalism and Identity in Ethnically Divided Societies: Northern Ireland and 
Malaysia,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 16, no. 3 (2016), 401. 
21 Lijphart, “Democracy in Plural Societies”, 31.  
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group separation and autonomy that verges on voluntary apartheid.22 This group 
autonomy can entrench the divisions between the communities rather than leading to the 
eventual bridging of them that consociationalism aims to accomplish.23   
While Lijphart proposes that federalism will aid with the consolidation of the 
national state and will weaken secessionist claims, others argue that devolved powers will 
strengthen the subnational units by providing them with increased political legitimacy.24 
Additionally, the focus on reducing conflict by limiting the amount of interaction 
between groups can also be problematic. Often, it can undermine the creation and 
continuation of overarching loyalties and solidify any pre-existing prejudices. Without 
interaction between the subnational groups, identification within the group is 
strengthened because there is little outside contact that could dispute negative 
associations with the other segments of the population. This could make accommodation 
and moderation increasingly difficult, as the level of trust or mutual respect may diminish 
or remain limited without building positive interactions. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
establish commonalities between the various segments of the population if the interaction 
between them is limited to the extent that the commonalities are rarely apparent. 
Recognizing commonalities between the groups is helpful, if not necessary, in reducing 
the level of tension in a consociational society because it is unlikely that elites would 
willingly choose to share power with those whom they share little in common.  
  
                                                 
22 Paul Dixon, “The Politics of Conflict: A Constructivist Critique of Consociational and Civil Society 
Theories,” Nations and Nationalism 18, no. 1 (2012), 102. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Joel Selway and Kharis Templeman, “The Myth of Consociationalism? Conflict Reduction in Divided 
Societies,” Comparative Political Science 45, no. 12 (December 2012), 1548-1549. 
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2.4 Devolution and Federalism  
Given the importance placed on providing the different segments of the 
population with self-rule within the consociational structure, the institutional design 
cannot completely avoid decentralization within it and still fulfill its group autonomy 
requirement. While this decentralization need not be territorial, a territorial 
decentralization, such as federalism, may be the natural way of implementing group 
autonomy in countries where the societal cleavages coincide with geographical regions. 
The problem posed by a federalist system in a consociational country is its tendency 
towards a stronger subnational status. For countries that already have aspects of 
independent power at a subnational level, the pull of federalism towards increased 
devolution exists outside of the consociational system, particularly if it predates that 
power-sharing institutional structure. However, for highly centralized states that wish to 
implement a consociational system, this issue of increased subnational legitimacy may 
become a greater problem. This is due to its paradoxical nature. While consociationalism 
seeks to prevent the pull into subnational communities, implementing a federal structure 
does that very thing. It creates and gives power to the subnational level that is 
independent of the power of the national government. It, therefore, reduces the power of 
the national government, which seems inconsistent with the aims of consociationalism.  
The general argument for federalism within the consociational idea is that it helps 
to reduce the direct conflict of the different subnational groups as they are given 
autonomous power over certain aspects of their society. Federalism provides a useful way 
of implementing this decentralized power, particularly if the segmental divisions 
correspond to specific territory within the country. For consociationalism, the goal of 
13 
 
federalism is to transform the subnational divisions from problems into “constructive 
elements of stable democracy.”25 When the groups are in constant competition with each 
other, they only contribute to instability, but removing some of the roots for their conflict 
by placing them under the individual group control can reduce this effect. However, in 
doing so, a federalist structure formalizes these divisions as the basis of politics.  
The pull towards federalism is not limited to consociationalism. Despite the 
strength of the synonymous nature of the nation and state in most of Europe, several 
countries, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, have implemented elements of 
devolutionary policies.26 The causes for this shift are linked to the existence of 
subnational legitimacy, either due to historical or ethnolinguistic identity factors or 
uneven regional economic development combined with a desire to achieve increased 
economic efficiency.27 Devolution refers to the shift of resources and responsibilities 
from a higher level of government, typically the national government, to lower levels of 
government, such as regions or locales. The devolution in Belgium represents one of the 
more extreme examples with its official federalization, as other countries either became 
federations with or around the time of their founding or have yet to implement the 
institutional changes that constitute a shift from a unitary state to a federal one.  
 Though the general trend over time has been the accumulation of power at the 
national level, there has been an increase in devolution in recent years. In an attempt to 
better understand this trend and the differing types of devolution, Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 
and Nicholas Gill (2002) developed a framework that distinguishes between two types of 
                                                 
25 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 42. 
26 Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Nicholas Gill, “The Global Trend towards Devolution and its Implications,” 
Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 21, no. 3 (June 2002), 337. 
27 Ibid. 
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devolution: decentralization of resources and decentralization of authority. A graphical 
depiction of their framework can be found in Appendix B. They argue that whether one 
type is chosen over the other relates to whether the central or regional governments begin 
with more legitimacy. They begin by looking at historic factors, such as culture, 
language, religion, and ethnicity, that tend to indicate a strong regional or national 
identity as well as the political support for both the central and regional governments.28 In 
addition, they note that the devolution itself produces a response that can either 
strengthen or weaken the legitimacy of the central and regional governments.29 They 
argue that in cases where the central government has more legitimacy, devolution occurs 
through decentralization of responsibilities with the central government losing minimal 
resources, while a case with stronger regional legitimacy will likely lead to an increase in 
resources at the subnational level.30 While both types of decentralization may occur, the 
strength of one type over the other is determined by the relative legitimacy of the central 
government to the regional government in their model. 
 This issue of legitimacy is particularly important as it pertains to understanding 
the effects of consociationalism, given its aims of reducing the role of the subnational 
divisions over time. While subnational legitimacy is not strictly linked to the strength of 
these divisions in all cases, for those countries whose federal divisions are based on 
ethnicity or other highly salient identity factors, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fully 
distinguish between them. This is reflected among the factors that affect the legitimacy of 
the subnational and national governments. For the consociational system, the legitimacy 
                                                 
28 Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, “The Global Trend towards Devolution and its Implications,” 335. 
29 Ibid., 336. 
30 Ibid., 335. 
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of the national government ought to increase as it would represent a realization of its goal 
of overcoming the problems posed by pluralism. The growth of legitimacy of the 
subnational government would instead represent a direct failure of the system by further 
entrenching the very divisions creating the problems the system hopes to solve.  
 
2.5 Centripetalism 
 While consociationalism seeks to provide representation to each ethnic group, 
centripetalism aims to depoliticize these divisions by institutionalizing cross-ethnic 
voting. Centripetalism draws its name from its idea of creating a system designed “to 
engineer a centripetal spin to the political system – to pull the parties towards moderate, 
compromising policies and to discover and reinforce the center of a deeply divided 
political spectrum.”31 Rather than allowing politicians to work within their own ethnic 
camps and expecting them to compromise after being elected, centripetalism encourages 
moving beyond these divisions prior to the election. The use of preferential, rank-order 
electoral system, often the alternative vote, is one of centripetalism’s main methods of 
persuading politicians to campaign beyond their ethnic group. 32  The alternative vote 
requires voters to rank all candidates, not only their first choice, and transfers votes based 
on those rankings in the case where no candidate reaches an outright majority.33 As a 
result, candidates are incentivized to reach out to groups that they might otherwise ignore 
                                                 
31 Timothy Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 19. 
32 Benjamin Reilly, “Institutional Designs for Diverse Democracies: Consociationalism, Centripetalism and 
Communalism Compared,” European Political Science 11 (2011), 264. 
33 Ibid. 
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if they only need a plurality to be elected. In other words, candidates are benefitted by 
appealing to a broad range of people, which favors moderation in their electoral strategy. 
 In order for the alternative vote to work in this manner, ethnic cleavages cannot 
serve as the basis for political representation. While encouraged by consociationalism, 
this form of representation runs counter to the principle of depoliticizing ethnic divisions 
in centripetalism. Instead, centripetalists encourage multiethnic parties by requiring 
parties to demonstrate a basis of support across the country or have an ethnically diverse 
party list.34 As a result, parties are not only incentivized to appeal broadly but also 
required to overcome ethnic divisions in order to be allowed to compete. This system 
makes refusal to expand beyond ethnic-based politics an unviable strategy since 
politicians need a basis of support beyond their own ethnic group in order to continue to 
participate in politics. 
 While centripetalists do not disagree on all the proposals of consociationalists, the 
two differ greatly in their proposals for structuring the institutions in which political 
parties operate. This focus on institutions in both ideas illuminates their shared belief that 
the political system itself can aggravate or alleviate the tension between different ethnic 
groups that leads to political instability. As both aim to encourage parties to work across 
the ethnic divisions and pursue moderate positions by changing the electoral system and 
political structure, one would expect that such changes would influence the parties to 
shift their strategies in order to succeed. Thus, to understand why regionalism has 
resurged in Belgium among political parties, it is necessary to explore the reforms and 
their effect on the country in general and the political parties in particular.   
                                                 
34 Benjamin Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies.” Democratization 
13, no. 5 (December 2006), 817-819. 
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORY OF REGIONALISM IN BELGIUM  
 While the linguistic dichotomy within Belgium predated the creation of the 
independent Belgian state, the territorial aspects appeared only in the decades following. 
Rather than inheriting the division of Flanders and Wallonia, Belgium received them 
through a lengthy process of social movements from inhabitants and elites from the two 
areas who created and promulgated the notion of Flemings and Walloons. The history of 
the Flemish and Walloon nationalist movements points to the traditional role of elites in 
driving, rather than alleviating, the ethnolinguistic division inside the country. 
 The first references to the ‘Walloon’ or ‘Flemish’ provinces appeared in 1814, but 
were strictly limited to territorial distinctions rather than a denotation of the existence of 
separate communities.35 These terms would eventually become co-opted by the leaders of 
the two regionalist movements, but were not rooted initially in the in-group/out-group 
rhetoric of today. Furthermore, the districts created by early Belgian leaders demonstrate 
that strict linguistic divisions had limited saliency at the national governmental level. 
This becomes clear when noting that both Limburg, a Dutch-speaking province, and 
Liège, a French-speaking province, were placed within the same district.36  
 A potential alternative explanation for this disregard of linguistic lines is that this 
was a natural consequence of the focus of the French-speaking elite who ruled the newly 
independent country. They desired to promote French as the national language and 
instituted a monolingual regime. Their strong emphasis on French as the governing 
language resulted from a belief in the superiority of the French language over Dutch and 
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from a desire to further distinguish themselves from the Netherlands after independence. 
Together, these factors encouraged the leaders of the new Belgian state to devalue the 
Dutch language and its role in the political system. Thus, it is possible that they would 
have ignored the language aspect of the provinces when establishing districts. However, 
given that linguistic division originating in a municipality that fell in the Limburg-Liège 
district caused the collapse of the national government in 1987, one must recognize that 
any linguistic division at the early stages of Belgium lacked the ability to drive politics in 
the same fashion that it does today. 37 
 
3.1 The Flemish Movement Prior to the State Reforms  
The monolingualism instituted by the ruling elite provided a rallying point for the 
initiators of the Flemish movement. French was the sole language of parliament, courts, 
the military, and the majority of secondary schools, leaving Dutch-speakers as second-
tier citizens as advancement was tied to knowledge of French. A collection of students, 
intellectuals, religious leaders, and local rulers organized to obtain a role for their 
language in their country. Their ambitions focused on achieving linguistic equity for 
Dutch in Flanders first and then in Belgium as a whole.38 The first major victory for their 
movement came in 1898 with the De Vriendt-Coremans law that placed Dutch as an 
official language of Belgium equal with French.39 However, the French ruling class 
fought against their efforts, limited the law to little more than a formality, and refused to 
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consider the adoption of a bilingual status for Wallonia like the one imposed in 
Flanders.40 As a result, Dutch-speaking Flemings coalesced around the promotion of a 
unique Flemish identity and culture that, over time, separated from an overarching 
Belgian identity.41 This represents their move to advocating for their own sub-nation of 
Flanders and, with it, the beginning of the nationalist movement with its own symbols, 
songs, and a national Flemish holiday.42  
 The First World War marked an important moment in the Flemish movement. 
During the occupation, Germany found the Flemish movement as an ideal tool to divide 
Belgium from within, making it easier to control. Thus, the Flemish nationalists, for the 
first time, had a ruling body sympathetic to their efforts.43 The power gained by the 
Flemish during the war did not disappear with the end of the occupation and the division 
between the linguistic groups could no longer be ignored. In 1921, Belgium was 
officially divided into two linguistic sections, and governments operating within the two 
segments were required to use the language of that section, thereby officially instituting 
the notion of two monolingual regions.44  
 For decades, the Flemish, who always numerically outnumbered the 
Francophones, were limited in their power due to economic and political inferiority. In 
the 1950s, this began to change with the growth of foreign investment in Brussels and 
Antwerp. The work of the Flemish movement had partially undercut the political power 
of the Francophones by creating and instilling a Flemish identity, but they had failed to 
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reduce the dependence of the region on agriculture. The postwar period changed this, 
especially as the steel and coal industries of Wallonia began to decline while the 
economic prospects of Flanders only increased. This positioned the Flemings to 
successfully make demands to obtain some autonomy and provided a platform for the 
newly formed Volksunie, a political party founded in 1954 dedicated to obtaining 
political and territorial power for Flemings, to capitalize on. The Volksunie experienced 
limited electoral success during the two decades prior to the reforms, culminating in 
receiving almost ten percent of the total vote share in the 1968 election.45  
 Around this same time, the growing tension between Flanders and Wallonia 
erupted in the Flemish city of Leuven, the home of the Catholic University of Louvain 
(Louvain being the French name for the city). This dispute would ultimately bring down 
the government, opening the door for the initial state reform. Higher education in the 
Dutch language had long been a rallying point for the Flemish movement, and the 
continued French presence at this university angered many Flemings, especially due to 
the proximity of the city to both Brussels and Wallonia. As the border between the two 
regions, and thus territorial monolingualism, hinged on the proportion of language 
speakers, any increase in French speakers in Leuven could risk the city joining Wallonia 
or becoming wrapped up in the complex workings of the Brussels suburbs. So, when the 
university moved to broaden its resources for Francophone students, the people of 
Leuven rioted, taking to the streets with the slogan “Walen buiten” (Walloons out).46 The 
university ultimately caved to pressure and moved the French part to Wallonia but this 
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situation had become so tense that the government fell, and new elections were called for 
in March 1968. That election saw the Volksunie gain eight additional seats in the 
Chamber of Representatives, bringing their total to twenty.47 The newly installed 
government knew that change was necessary if they wanted to avoid the fate of their 
predecessors. This reform came in 1970. 
 
3.2 The Walloon Movement Prior to the State Reforms 
While markedly smaller than its counterpart in Flanders, the Walloon Movement 
also dates back to the 19th century. Like the Flemish Movement, its initial concern 
centered on language. To understand the origins of the Walloon Movement, which until 
the interwar period is perhaps better understood as a Francophone movement, it is 
important to grasp the motivations of the leaders of the early Belgian state as it pertains to 
language policy. For them, French represented the path to civilization and refinement. As 
the Flemish Movement sought to achieve equal status for Dutch, numerous Francophones 
saw this as an affront to the existence of a civilized society as they regarded Dutch as 
crude and backward. The Francophones in Brussels felt acutely threatened by these 
linguistic laws pursued by the Flemish activists due to the capital’s location within the 
territory of Flanders. So, the first instance of what would become the Walloon Movement 
began with these French speakers in Brussels.48 
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However, Brussels was not, and is not, Walloon, and therefore could not speak to 
a broader Walloon culture. As the Flemish Movement adopted its cultural aspects to 
advocate for its heritage, Walloons began to counteract this by promoting their own. 1912 
served as a defining year for this effort with two major events: the creation of the 
Assemblée wallonne (Walloon Assembly) and Jules Destrée’s letter to the King of 
Belgium. Like the Flemish Movement had done two decades prior, the Assemblée 
wallonne selected their own emblem and national holiday.49 The letter by Jules Destrée, 
entitled “Letter to the King, Concerning the Separation of Flanders and Wallonia,” was a 
remarkable moment in the history of Belgian regionalism with its famous line of “Il y a 
en Belgique, des Wallons et des Flamands; il n’y a pas de Belges” (In Belgium, there are 
Walloons and Flemings; there are no Belgians).50 Destrée has been considered the 
founding father of the Walloon Movement, and his letter exemplifies the reasons for its 
existence through its delineation of the things that Walloon activists believed the Flemish 
had taken from them: Flanders, their money, security, and, most importantly, their 
language.51 The most radical aspect of the letter was its endorsement of a federal solution 
for Belgium should the Flemish continue to ignore Walloon interests. The Walloon 
Movement as a whole did not embrace the idea of regional autonomy until the eve of 
World War II, but the impact of this letter, along with the Assemblée wallonne, shifted 
the focus of linguistic activists from a broader Francophone cause to a concentration on 
Wallonia.  
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The 1950s marked the beginning of a Walloon consciousness. Until the end of 
World War II, Walloon activists failed to mirror the strength of the movement of the 
Flemings. This changed as Wallonia recognized that its historic position of superiority 
over the North was waning. Economic development had progressed significantly in 
Brussels and Antwerp, two cities located outside of Wallonia, while Walloon industries 
fell behind and became increasingly expensive to maintain. Thus, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Walloons faced the threat of marginalization. The gains of the Flemish movement had 
weakened the status of French and had almost eradicated the language from Flanders 
completely. Furthermore, the majority of the Belgian population resided in Flanders. 
Economic dominance was the last remaining factor that prevented them from complete 
minority status, but the decades leading up the reforms made it clear that this too would 
be gone in the near future.  
With this in mind, the Walloon activists had to seek support from the average 
Wallonia resident, who had mostly ignored the regionalist movement due to historically 
experiencing economic prosperity and a lack of fear of losing their language. After all, 
the Francophones in Brussels, who were more cognizant of the possible problems posed 
by a Flemish majority, had been cast aside decades earlier in favor of a Walloon cultural 
push. The 1960s brought a loss of jobs in the industrial sector, in which the majority of 
Walloons were employed, without a comparable gain in another sector.52 The activists 
declared that the national government’s funding of the Flemish economy incentivized 
development in Flanders at the cost of Wallonia and that federalism was necessary to 
rectify this and protect Walloon interests.53 This message rallied the working class to 
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their side and the Leuven crisis, with the Flemish rallying cries of ‘Walloons out,’ 
brought the country to a near-breaking point. The average Walloon agreed with the 
assessment made by Destrée in 1912: reform was necessary to protect Wallonia. 
 
3.3 The Reforms 
3.3.1 The First State Reform – 1970 
 The first state reform established two separate overlapping subdivisions of the 
country: the Communities and the Regions. Each Community and Region was to be given 
its own institutional structure in the form of a parliament, though the ones for the Regions 
did not come into existence until the second state reform. 
Communities in the Belgium context correspond to the three linguistic groups 
within the country: the French speakers, the Dutch speakers, and the German speakers (a 
small segment of the population residing in Wallonia along the border with Germany). 
The Communities are tasked with cultural matters, the most important being education 
policy.54 The 1970 reform left the Communities without delineated borders. In general, 
the Flemish Community was placed in control of all schools in Flanders and any school 
in Brussels in which the primary language of instruction was Dutch while the French 
Community received the same authority in Wallonia and the French-speaking schools in 
Brussels.55 This preserved the bilingual nature of Brussels as each individual family 
could choose whether to send their child to a Dutch or French school, thereby ensuring 
the continued role of their linguistic community in the education of their child.56  
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The role of the Regions is to provide economic autonomy to different territorial 
areas of Belgium.57 The constitutional reform indicated that there were to be three 
different Regions: Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia. The difficulty that the government 
experienced in establishing the institutions for the Regions was based on the issue of 
territoriality itself, since they could not sidestep the issue of borders as they did with the 
Communities. This was particularly problematic for the Brussels Capital Region (BCR), 
which explains the lack of a Brussels regional parliament until the third state reform. The 
issue of Brussels prevented the creation of the other two Regions as well, since Brussels 
is enclaved within the Flanders Region. To create the Flanders Region, it would have to 
be decided which suburbs surrounding Brussels would count within its Region and which 
would not. This was a highly contentious issue given that Brussels is bilingual while 
Flanders is not. In other words, the determination of the border could have the 
consequence of placing French speakers within a monolingual Flanders, which 
Francophones could not accept, while a too large Brussels would anger Flemings, who 
would view it as territorial theft on the part of the French speakers. This ‘stealing’ of 
Flemish land had, after all, partially incited the Leuven crisis. So, the government was 
reasonably concerned with the reception of any delineation of Brussels, as it was unlikely 
to please both groups. 
The other parts of the 1970 reform focused on ensuring protection for political 
minorities, both within the Regions and Communities and at the national level.58 At the 
subnational level, the concern was that the major political parties drew support from 
specific areas of the country, namely the Christian Democrats in Flanders and the 
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Socialists in Wallonia. While the regions were hardly politically homogenous, it seemed 
highly possible that those two parties would have outsized support within their 
Region/Community and would be able to suppress the other parties. To address this 
concern, the government added an amendment requiring the subnational governments to 
protect the freedom and rights of political minorities.59 At the national level, the fear of 
the Walloons that their numerical minority would lead to their inability to stop undesired 
actions by a Flemish majority led to two amendments. The first decreed that the national 
government must have an equal number of Francophone and Flemish ministers with an 
exception for the role of Prime Minister, and the second created the notion of Special 
Laws.60 Special Laws refer to any law that addresses the relationship of the 
ethnolinguistic groups in Belgium that is not in the form of a constitutional amendment 
and require the approval of a simple majority among the two linguistic groups and a two-
thirds majority of the entire Parliament to pass.61 These laws ensured that French 
speakers would not suffer under the tyranny of a Flemish majority, thereby cementing the 
consociational principle of the mutual veto. 
3.3.2 The Second State Reform – 1980 
 Ten years after the initial reform, the Regions existed only in the Constitution. 
The second state reform sought to bring them into reality, though the BCR would not 
materialize for another eight years. To establish the Region of Flanders, a provisional 
boundary was created between Flanders and Brussels under an agreement that a 
permanent border would be decided later.62 The two established Regions were given 
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authority over “environment, housing policy,” and “regional aspects of economic policy” 
as well as the ability to create decrees.63 The Communities received additional 
responsibilities in the form of health and social policies.64 The parliaments for the 
Regions and Communities were comprised of members of the national parliament, except 
for the German-speaking Community which obtained a directly-elected parliament. The 
finances for the subnational governments was to come mostly from a set portion of the 
national tax revenue.65 
 This reform also saw the creation of the Court of Arbitration whose main purpose 
was to settle disputes over what powers belonged to the Regions, Communities, or 
national government.66 This was necessary for two interrelated reasons. First, the 
Constitution stipulated the general category of policies that belonged to each 
governmental entity but did not provide an exclusive list, thus providing the possibility 
that different parliaments could equally claim to have authority over a particular issue. 
Second, the Belgian politicians refused to establish any hierarchical structure between the 
parliaments. This meant that the national parliament is considered equal to those of the 
Communities and Regions. Furthermore, it prevents the possibility of overlap on policy 
as decrees could otherwise conflict with national laws and one could not outweigh the 
other due to the lack of hierarchy. This made the possibility of uncertainty over who had 
authority over a certain issue a potentially major problem.  
 After the creation of the two Regions, the Flemish Community and Region 
decided to merge into a single authority with one parliament. A merger between the 
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French Community and Walloon Region would have been considerably more 
complicated given the large number of French speakers in Brussels, while the proportion 
of Dutch speakers in Brussels to those in Flanders was small enough that it was fairly 
easy to overcome. This disparity between the two halves of Belgium has allowed the 
Flemish Parliament to emerge as a singular representative authority for Flemish interests 
in a way that Francophones have not been able to replicate with the subnational powers 
divided between three parliaments.  
3.3.3 The Third State Reform – 1988 
 Like the initial state reform, the third reform occurred following the fall of the 
government due to a crisis relating to the language status of a city in Flanders. This time, 
the city in question was Voeren. Voeren is a Flemish enclave within Wallonia along the 
country’s border with the Netherlands. It had ended up as part of the Flanders due to 
political bargaining leading up to the 1962 language law that had determined the official 
language status of each Belgian province.67 Despite this official status, a Walloon party 
had dominated local politics and the mayor refused to use Dutch, despite it being the 
official language of the city, unless the language status of Voeren was addressed.68 The 
national parliament was divided on this issue and failed to find a solution, partially 
because any reopening of debates on the language policy of one area could spread to 
others, namely Brussels whose borders remained tenuous. 
 The government that came to power following this incident realized that a 
permanent delineation of the BCR was necessary to remove its constant status as a threat 
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to government stability. The Flemish parties prevented the expansion of Brussels beyond 
the nineteen municipalities given bilingual status in 1962, but compensated the 
Francophones by establishing French language facilities in six outer regions despite their 
official status as part of Flanders.69 In addition, those cities and Voeren would be given 
institutional structures to guarantee the role of the minority language in the local 
government.70 This agreement allowed the BCR to become operational, finally 
establishing all of the Regions and Communities that had been added into the 
Constitution in 1970. The BCR immediately received a directly elected parliament, 
unlike Flanders and Wallonia, which continued to have representatives who served at 
both the regional and national level.  
 Power devolution in this reform involved transferring remaining educational 
policy control to the Communities and public works and industrial policy to the 
Regions.71 This led to the subnational governments obtaining larger budgets, particularly 
for the Regions, whose budgets were nearly tripled.72 The overall expenditures of the 
subnational units accounted for twenty percent of the national governmental expenditures 
following this reform.73 However, this was not accompanied by greater fiscal autonomy, 
since, during the reform process, the public learned of the vast amount of financial 
transfers from the now-richer Flanders to Wallonia.74 The backlash to this revelation 
threatened to undermine the already-weakened solidarity between the two regions, so the 
financing for the Regions and Communities was addressed in a Special Finance Law in 
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1989 that has remained controversial. It established criteria by which the revenue of the 
subnational governments would be determined and provided significant benefits for the 
Region/Community with a weaker economy.75 
3.3.4 The Fourth State Reform – 1993 
 The fourth reform officially declared what had been informally established by the 
first three reforms: Belgium was no longer a unitary state but a federal entity. Flanders 
and Wallonia finally received direct election for their regional parliaments and the 
number of seats in the national government decreased significantly, with the Chamber of 
Representatives losing almost thirty percent of its seats and the Senate reduced by sixty 
percent.76 Additionally, this reform allowed the Regions and Communities to establish a 
foreign policy related to their competences and required that any treaties that the national 
government pursued that overlapped with a competence of a subnational government 
must obtain agreement from the Communities or Regions depending on the issue.77 In 
practice, this means that Belgium cannot sign onto any international trade treaties if a 
Region objects since this would interfere with the economic competences of that Region.   
3.3.5 The Fifth State Reform – 2001 
 The fifth state reform was comprised of two parts: the Lambermont Agreement, 
which involved mostly further devolution, and the Lombard Agreement, which affected 
the institutions of the Brussels Capital Region. The Lambermont Agreement increased 
the number of funds transferred to the Communities from the federal government.78 In 
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regard to the Regions, in addition to receiving a limited amount of fiscal autonomy, 
provincial and local laws were placed under their jurisdiction, shifting the oversight of 
the local level from the federal government to the Regions.79 The Lombard Agreement 
addressed the lack of guaranteed representation for Flemings within Brussels at both the 
regional and municipal level and changed the representation of Brussels in the Flemish 
Parliament. 80  Whereas previously the members had served in both bodies and were 
directly elected to the Brussels Parliament, the Lombard Agreement made them directly 
elected to the Flemish Parliament, no longer a part of the Brussels Parliament, and limited 
their voting power in the Flemish Parliament to solely community matters.81 
3.3.6 The Sixth State Reform – 2012 
  The sixth reform showcased the increased strength of the subnational 
governments. In a reversal of the original structure of the regional parliaments, the Senate 
is no longer directly elected and is instead composed of members of the regional and 
community parliaments that those parliaments themselves elect to send to the Senate.82 
The powers of the Senate were also greatly reduced, as the legislative process at the 
federal level has been made a unicameral procedure through the Chamber of 
Representatives for most matters.83 The Senate is now a non-permanent body tasked with 
addressing constitutional and institutional related acts and mostly provides a means for 
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the Communities and the Regions to directly influence policy at the national level, though 
this remains limited to the narrow list of issues under the Senate’s purview.84 
 The financing of the Regions has been greatly affected by this reform due to its 
changes to the Special Finance Law of 1989. Starting in 2014, the Regions gained 
increased taxation powers. Previously, the amount they collected from personal income 
tax was set by the national government. They now can increase or decrease the amount of 
taxes on top of the federal tax that they collect and are able to reduce the amount of 
federal income tax collected regarding matters that fall under their competences.85 The 
Communities remain financed solely by funds devolved from the national government. 
Additionally, the highly controversial solidarity mechanism, which led to a continual 
transfer of funds from Flanders to Wallonia has changed. The funding for the Regions is 
no longer tied to economic performance, except that a Region or Community cannot “be 
structurally impoverished.”86 To reduce the impact that this will adversely have on 
Wallonia, the transfers are slowly phasing out over a period of ten years with a reduction 
of ten percent per year.87 
 The series of the six reforms has demonstrated the influence that the subnational 
nations have gained since the founding of Belgium. The extensive efforts to reduce 
tension between the Flemings and Walloons have created an institutional structure that, 
as will be seen in the next chapters, has shifted the focus of the country from the national 
level to the subnational level, thereby solidifying the notion of separate ethnolinguistic 
groups within the country that were not recognized in 1830.   
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CHAPTER 4: A RESHAPED BELGIUM 
 The political system that has emerged from the reforms is complicated, with 
effectively six separate parliaments with equal powers.  A simplified visualization of the 
relationships between the parliaments can be seen in Appendix C. While the 
Communities and Regions are separate entities under the Belgian Constitution, in 
Flanders, they govern as one body. A partial stipulation must be made regarding this, 
though, since some members, the six who represent the Dutch-speaking residents of 
Brussels, of the Flemish parliament are only partial members and can only vote on 
matters pertaining to the Flemish Community. For Belgian Francophones, the 
relationship between the Communities and Regions is slightly different because the 
Walloon parliament remains a separate governing body from the French Community. The 
French Community parliament is composed of all of the elected representatives of the 
Walloon parliament, excluding the two German-speaking representatives who are 
replaced by French-speaking members of the same party, and nineteen selected 
representatives from the Brussels Capital Region (BCR). Thus, although Walloons are 
technically governed by two separate subnational parliaments, their relationship with the 
French Community and their Region is similar to that of the Flemings, since they have 
the same elected representatives in both bodies. It is those living in the bilingual  
BCR that have a more complicated situation. The parliament for the BCR has eighty-nine 
deputies, but only twenty-five of those members also represent their language 
community. This arrangement does little to counteract the role that Brussels plays in 
domestic political discourse as a city torn between Flanders and Wallonia despite its 
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official status as an equal Region, though it prevents it from otherwise having an outsized 
role in the governance of the Communities.  
With the major transformation of the Belgian political system due to the reforms, 
one would expect to see shifts in the way in which politics operates within the country. 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight these changes as it pertains to the broader 
strength and legitimacy of regionalism. Before discussing the actual effects, it is 
important to recall the expected outcomes of the reforms. Belgian politicians sought a 
way to counteract the tensions caused by rising regionalism and to protect the interests of 
the groups they represented. The goal was to appease the regionalists and return politics 
to its traditional form of economic and social disagreements between the Christian 
Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals. However, as will be seen, these efforts only 
temporarily addressed the problem and, in fact, created a structure that has proved 
beneficial to enterprising regionalists.   
 
4.1 The Disappearance of the Belgian Voter 
As discussed in the previous chapter, regionalist parties are not an entirely new 
phenomenon. However, they remained marginalized as the politics of Belgian centered 
on the three major social cleavages of the country: the Socialists, the Christian 
Democrats, and the Liberals. In the 1968 election, two regionalists parties, the Volksunie 
and the French-Speaking Democratic Front (FDF), received a combined 15.7% percent of 
the vote with the remaining 85% going to the traditional parties.88 Despite only obtaining 
this small proportion, the regionalist parties succeeded in their push for a devolution of 
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power and achieved the first state reform, mostly due to the other parties deeming it in 
their best interests to do so. The 1971 election appeared to mark a shift in fortunes for the 
regionalist parties, particularly for the FDF, as they nearly doubled their vote share and 
seat count in the Chamber of Representatives. Yet, while the gains for those particular 
parties dissipated over time, their impact, along with the reforms, led to the breakdown of 
the historic three-party system that had guided the country since the latter half of the 19th 
century.  
The slow rise of the Volksunie, the FDF, and the RW (Walloon Rally) during the 
1960s forced the traditional parties to grapple with these new threats. They addressed the 
rise of the regionalist parties by beginning the state reform process and dividing into 
linguistic camps. The Christian Democrats were the first party to split, doing so in 1968, 
following the Leuven crisis. It is understandable that their separation proceeded the 
others given that the strongest regional presence came from Flanders, a significant base 
for their party, as well as the commonalities between the typical Christian Democrat voter 
and those that opted for the Volksunie.89 The voter profile of the two parties overlapped 
greatly, more so than the Volksunie did with the Socialists or Liberals, and, as a result, 
the Christian Democrats faced greater pressure to address regionalism.90 The Liberals 
succumbed in 1972 after small regional factions had already abandoned the party, while 
the Socialists managed to remain united until 1978. 
The continued unity of the Socialists until a decade after the split of the Christian 
Democrats can be explained by their ability to avoid the dramatic effects of regionalism. 
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The RW, which posed the greatest threat to the Socialists’ base of power in Wallonia, 
remained the weakest of the three regionalist parties and only experienced electoral 
success when allied with the FDF.91 The Socialists managed to maintain a fairly constant 
vote share despite the dramatic rise of the regionalists. Like the other parties, their totals 
decreased between 1965 to 1971, but their decrease remained the smallest. Importantly, 
while the other parties began to regain their lost votes after splitting, the Socialists instead 
remained consistent and, in fact, fell in their overall vote share in the 1978 election. After 
watching their political adversary, the Christian Democrats, experience improved success 
with their regional arms, the party leadership of the Socialists decided that they could no 
longer resist the pull towards the Communities and separated into their different linguistic 
camps. Since that division, the country has lacked any true national party, and thus lacks 
any party that campaigns in both Wallonia and Flanders. Instead, they only aim to appeal 
to the voters within their party’s linguistic group.   
While the separation of the major parties weakened or eliminated their ability to 
counterbalance the spread of the conceptualization of Belgian in regional terms, it did 
position them to address the issues that strengthened the regionalist parties. They 
succeeded in doing so that by the mid-2000s, it seemed that the age of the regionalist 
parties had come to an end. The success of the regionalist party, the N-VA (New Flemish 
Alliance), in recent elections signaled that Flemish support for regionalist parties had not 
dissipated. Instead, it exploded with the N-VA receiving a larger vote share than any of 
its predecessors and nearly obtaining, on its own, the combined vote share obtained by 
the FDF and Volksunie in the 1971 election, the previous peak of regionalist party 
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support. A graphical depiction of the shifts in vote share for various regional parties and 
for the regionalist parties as a whole in each election year since 1968 can be seen in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.  
 
Figure 4.1 - Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. “PARLINE Database on National Parliaments.” Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp (accessed October 27, 2018); Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data. “European Election Database: Belgium.” 1991-2010. http://www. nsd.uib.no/european_election_ 
database/country/belgium/ (Accessed: September 21, 2018).  
 
Figure 4.2 - Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. “PARLINE Database on National Parliaments.” Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp (accessed October 27, 2018); Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data. “European Election Database: Belgium.” 1991-2010. http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_ 
database/country/belgium/ (Accessed: September 21, 2018). 
9.79
11.1
10.2
10.04
7
9.93
7.9 8
5.89
4.67
5.56
1.12 1.4
1.9
6.58
7.83
9.87
11.68 11.99
7.76
3.67
3.06
17.4
20.26
5.9
11.2 10.94
4.26 4.17 4.18
1.2 1.2
1.47
1.8
2.84
2.86
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010 2014
%
 V
o
te
 S
h
a
re
Election Year
Figure 4.1 - Vote Share of Regionalist Parties, 1968-2014
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Figure 4.2: Combined Regionalist Vote Share, 1968-2014 
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Thus, the major story of Belgian regionalist parties centered around their demise 
and the ability of the regionalized major parties to render them obsolete. However, this 
fails to account the rapid rise of the N-VA. Following the fracturing of the Volksunie, the 
N-VA was its sole successor party to compete in the 2003 election as an independent 
party. Another offshoot, known as Spirit, realized that it lacked the support necessary to 
compete at a major level and decided to partner with Sp.a, the Flemish Socialists.92 This 
lasted until 2008, at which point Spirit chose to operate on their own, but they failed to 
garner enough votes to obtain a single seat in the Chamber of Representatives in the 2010 
election.93 While the N-VA did not immediately become absorbed by another party, they 
only managed to obtain 3.06% of the total votes and opted to ally with the CD&V for the 
2007 election.94 By the 2010 federal election, they received 17.4% of the total vote 
share.95 Certainly, the obituaries for all regionalist parties were premature. Somehow the 
N-VA managed to break free from the fates shared by its predecessors, both Francophone 
and Flemish. 
4.1.1 The Demise of the Cross-Cutting Cleavages 
Repercussions of the breakdown along linguistic lines extend beyond electoral 
effects. The ideologies of the three parties had historically cut across the ethnolinguistic 
divide, with both Walloons and Flemings identifying with each party in large numbers. 
Stereotypes painted Wallonia as a Socialist party stronghold with the Christian 
Democrats succeeding mostly in Flanders, but the reality was more complicated than this. 
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The Socialists certainly relied on Wallonia for votes, though this was the result of 
socioeconomic factors rather than ethnolinguistic ones. Their voters were mostly 
industrial workers and, since Wallonia had undergone more industrialization than other 
areas of the country, Walloons constituted the majority of their voting bloc.96 The 
Christian Democrats drew support throughout Flanders and in the southern areas of 
Wallonia, while Liberal voters had little geographic tendencies, though they did typically 
experience better results in Brussels and the surrounding area.97 The splitting of the 
parties severed these linkages.  
Cross-cutting cleavages serve an important role in plural societies, such as 
Belgium, through their ability to provide connections to otherwise divided groups. This 
occurs at both the level of the voter and the politician. The individual voter who identifies 
with different groups that overlap has a linkage to segments of the larger population that 
they would not if the divisions completely coincided. In a practical example in Belgium, 
the Walloon who supported the Christian Democratic party had ties to the larger 
Francophone/Walloon group as well as to those who also support the Christian 
Democratic party, which provided an association with a large swath of Flemings. These 
linkages tend to moderate opinions as people are more likely to think of the negative 
effects that a hardline stance on one factor could cause to members of another group with 
which they identify. A similar effect occurs on the politician as they must moderate their 
rhetoric due to the recognition that the group they represent, while potentially 
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homogenous at the ideological level, is heterogeneous on another factor.98 Thus, for the 
major parties in Belgium, their regionalist aspect was moderated as the party as a whole 
represented both Walloons and Flemings and the leadership had to act accordingly. They 
could not denounce one ethnolinguistic group in favor of the other without isolating an 
important element of their voting bloc.  
Interestingly, even the regionalist parties during the 1960s and 70s seemed to 
recognize the cross-cutting nature of the major parties. They refused to address the 
traditional dividing issue of religion and also avoided entrapping themselves with any 
particular economic policies.99 The tenets of their platforms rested on the issue of the 
relationship of the national government and the ethnolinguistic groups. Had the typical 
stereotypes of a Christian Democrat Flanders and a socialist Wallonia directly coincided 
with the actual division of the two regions, the reluctance of the regionalist parties to 
align accordingly would be strange, particularly as they presented themselves as the best 
representatives to advocate for their group. Instead, the regionalist parties distanced 
themselves from the traditional dividing lines out of concern of isolating those that would 
otherwise support their agenda.  
Originally, the three parties provided a cross-cutting cleavage with the linguistic 
division. Though the parties always had a certain element of territorialism, this was no 
more severe than in other countries and did not originate from intentional discourse based 
on dividing the country on the basis of language. With their breakdown on linguistic 
lines, whatever moderating effect this had on the Belgian ethnolinguistic divisions was 
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eradicated at both the level of the voter and the politician. Certainly, this did not occur 
overnight but, as years have progressed, the halves of the parties have drifted further 
apart as they adopted differing leadership and electoral platforms and have voted 
increasingly on linguistic lines, especially as it pertains to state reforms.100 By the most 
recent federal election in 2014, the cooperation between what initially began as the two 
regional halves of the same ideological party had weakened to the point where the 
Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) were part of the coalition government while the 
French Christian Democrats (cdH) remained in the opposition.101  
This breakdown plays a role in concentrating the focus of the country to the 
regional level. Politicians no longer need to consider the other linguistic community 
when campaigning and constructing party platforms, except perhaps for derogatory 
purposes in pitting their region against the other. The removal of the cross-cutting 
cleavage additionally removes a barrier to solely constructing one’s identity in regional 
terms. Now, when a Walloon thinks of their political party, they do not have any Flemish 
figures to think of as ideological compatriots as they do not operate under the same party 
banner. Instead, their party serves only to reinforce that they are a Walloon and a 
Francophone. No longer does the regional-minded Belgian have to seek out the 
regionalist party to support this identity since the parties have decided that they too are 
regional. The sole exception to this phenomenon is the Green parties, which now act as a 
single party in the federal government and propose agendas together.102  
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4.1.2 The Reign of the Regionalist Voter   
With their separation, the traditional parties began their efforts to chase the 
regionalist voter. Their fear of losing power to an outside threat drove them to change 
their electoral approach to coax these voters back into their traditional camps. The 
success from this shift in reducing support for the regionalists and returning the parties to 
their previous position as the sole arbiters of Belgian politics reinforced this notion of the 
importance of a strong position regarding regionalism. This focus was only compounded 
by the electoral structure providing greater benefits to a regional focus with the direct 
election of the regional parliaments. In order to succeed at this level, parties needed to 
concentrate their message on benefitting their Region, with less regard for the federal 
since it was no longer the place of the only major election in the country, and began their 
efforts to represent the position of their Region on regionalism better than their 
competitors. With these positions, certain halves of the major parties formed electoral 
cartels with the regionalist parties: the FDF partnered with the MR (the Francophone 
Liberals), the N-VA with the CD&V, and Spirit with Sp.a (the Flemish Socialists).  
 In this chase, the parties eventually outpaced the general population, yet they 
suffered no electoral blowback from this extremism. Instead, as will be demonstrated in 
the next chapter, they watched as efforts to compromise led to the electoral success of 
those who failed to do so. This situation can be attributed to a reduction of saliency of the 
continuation of Belgium on the Flemish side while the saliency of devolution and 
separatism remains strong among a segment of voters. In Wallonia, the situation is 
similar but an inverse in the positions: voters are motivated to vote against further 
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devolution while those indifferent or supportive of such measures are more concerned 
with other issues.  
 This reality can be seen in analyzing voter volatility and the types of voters drawn 
to the regionalists. A panel survey given following the 2009 and 2014 regional elections 
found that almost half of the Belgians surveyed had switched their vote from one party in 
2009 to a different one in 2014.103 It further concluded that the traditional parties along 
with the Green parties obtain the greatest share of their votes from the stable voters, while 
the N-VA obtained a significant share of its votes from those who voted for a different 
party in 2014.104 Given the great increase in votes for the N-VA in the 2014 election 
compared to their results in the 2009 election, this is not surprising, but when analyzed in 
companion with a similar voter volatility study that focused solely on N-VA voters, the 
predicament for the traditional parties becomes clearer. This study found that a voter’s 
preference for Flemish independence significantly increased the likelihood that a voter 
would switch from any of the traditional parties to the N-VA.105 
 With so much volatility, particularly driven among voters in favor of Flemish 
independence, Flemish parties cannot afford to abandon regionalism as it would risk 
potentially losing more voters to the N-VA. The dynamics of the electorate further 
compound this as they cannot hope to regain these votes by appealing to a more moderate 
position on regionalism, as such voters likely continue to support the traditional parties as 
they have no alternative. Unlike in the 1960s where the parties turned to regionalism to 
                                                 
103 Ruth Dassoneville and Dieter Stiers. “Electoral Volatility in Belgium (2009-2014): Is There a 
Difference Between Stable and Volatile Voters?” Acta Politica 53, no. 1 (February 2017), 83. 
104 Ibid., 79. 
105 Joris Boonen and Marc Hooghe. “Do Nationalist Parties Shape or Follow Sub-National Identities? A 
Panel Analysis on the Rise of the Nationalist Party in the Flemish Region of Belgium, 2006-11,” Nations 
and Nationalism 20, no. 1 (2014), 68. 
44 
 
counteract the rise of the regionalist parties, there is no threat faced by the Flemish parties 
at the center that advocates for an anti-regionalist position.  
Even if enough support existed for such a party, the dynamics of the electoral 
system inhibits its potential success. As a result, the voters who are either unmotivated by 
regionalism or against its spread are ignored by party leadership who fears the loss of the 
regionalist voter more than that of the non-regionalist voter, as it is assumed the latter has 
nowhere to go. The non-regionalist voter is seen as selecting a party based on factors 
other than regionalism and thus is unaffected by the party’s position on the issue. The 
pro-Belgian voter has yet to constrict the posturing of the Flemish parties in the way that 
the pro-Flanders voter can. The continued growth of the Regions makes the resurgence of 
the power of the pro-Belgian voter less likely, particularly now that success in one of the 
two houses of the federal parliament depends on one’s ability to win at the regional level, 
something more difficult for a party whose foundation opposes increased prominence of 
the Region. Thus, the centrifugal tendency of the Belgian parties further and further away 
from their counterparts in the other Region will likely continue, particularly as the rise of 
the N-VA reaffirms the importance of the regional-minded voter. 
 
4.2 Devolution and Regional Legitimacy 
 With the end of the cross-cutting cleavages, there was little to mitigate the 
relevance of the regional identity. However, as parties took on a regional aspect, it could 
be argued that any vote for these non-national parties allowed for the voicing of regional 
feelings and that the regionalist parties became obsolete. The decline of vote share for 
these parties in the 1980s and 1990s seems to coincide with this reasoning. Despite this, 
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the N-VA managed to break this trend and become the largest party indicating that 
regionalism has not disappeared as a factor that influences Flemish voters. A driving 
force behind this has been the institutional reforms that have aided in increasing regional 
and linguistic community legitimacy, which, in turn, has only furthered the salience of 
the ethnolinguistic identities. While the Belgian leadership sought reforms to provide 
more autonomy to the regions in the hopes of minimizing the overall tensions, the 
splitting of the electorates and creation of regional and community parliaments has 
provided a governmental structure that has effectively created two functioning states 
within one country. With this reality, it has been relatively easy for Bart De Wever, the 
current leader of the N-VA, and his party to reinforce the idea in the minds of Flemish 
voters that the current structure is inefficient and that Flanders can survive on its own. 
 To look at this issue of the legitimacy of the region and community in the case of 
Belgium, particularly in Flanders, it is important to recall the relationship between the 
legitimacy of the national and subnational government and devolution, as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and displayed in Appendix B. Legitimacy is affected by various historical 
factors as well as the political support for the government.106 It then influences the 
method of devolution based on whether the national or subnational has greater 
legitimacy. The type of devolution can, in turn, affect the legitimacy of the government 
based on reception of the devolution and the way that it changes the way people view 
future devolution and the existing government units.107 If the reception of devolution is 
positive and the subnational government is viewed positively, the legitimacy of the 
subnational government will continue to grow. On the other hand, if the devolution is met 
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with backlash, the national legitimacy will likely increase in relation to that of the 
subnational.  
 Chapter 3 provided a discussion of the subnational legitimacy in Belgium leading 
up to the devolutionary process. By the time of the reforms, Wallonia and Flanders had 
constructed their own identities within the Belgian state and had succeeded in obtaining 
territorial monolingualism. With these elements in place, they had moved towards 
strengthening the salience of the linguistic identity in both segments of the country. The 
success of the regionalist parties in the election of 1968 and the societal pressures that 
caused the major parties to turn to reforms further developed the subnational legitimacy.  
However, it is difficult to contend that at the beginning of the devolutionary 
process that the regions had greater legitimacy than the nation. The major dividing groups 
of Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Liberals each still obtained a greater share of 
votes than any of the regionalist parties, and this continued in the 1971 election 
immediately following the first reform. Furthermore, given the lack of institutions at the 
regional/community level prior to the reforms, any legitimacy they had was informal. 
Thus, in line with the prediction of the devolutionary framework, the initial reforms 
involved mostly a decentralization of responsibility.  
 As evidenced by the breakdown of the political parties on the linguistic lines, 
devolution was not met with backlash as people accepted the creation of the 
Communities and Regions and the economic and social powers given to the subnational 
units. To some extent, it simply reflected a pre-existing reality. The majority of 
legitimacy remained at the national level though, as it took several years for the 
regional/community parliaments to come into existence, and even then, they initially 
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were comprised of politicians who had been elected to the national parliament. This 
continued to emphasize the national government, since those who would decide on 
regional matters served primarily at the national level. As a result, the regional and 
community parliaments continued to operate underneath the national government rather 
than separately from it. The existence of these new governmental bodies did provide an 
additional challenger to the national government though, even if part of this was negated 
by their ties to the central government. This linkage of the politicians serving at both 
levels was ruptured with the official federalization in 1993.  
 While the national government continued to have greater legitimacy moving into 
the 1993 election, the lopsided nature of their legitimacy over that of the subnational was 
quickly deteriorating. The growing strength of the legitimacy of the subnational 
governments prior to 1993 reform can be seen in a 1991 National Election Survey. 
Questions asked to the participants included their self-identification as Belgian or 
Flemish/Walloon/Francophone and their desire for future decentralization.108 Around 
56% of the Flemish respondents wished for the Regions and Communities to continue to 
grow in power, with almost 11% completely rejecting Belgium altogether.109 Walloons 
were less certain, with only 35% categorized as regionalists.110 The continued strength of 
the national government remained evident in the survey as well with about 30% of the 
participants among both Walloons and Flemings desiring no further devolution.111 So, a 
significant portion of the population fell on both sides of the debate over increased 
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devolution at the point of the 1991 elections, but following the 1991-1992 crisis, public 
opinion in Flanders lurched towards a completely independent Flanders.112 
 The official declaration making Belgium a federal state in 1993 marked a point of 
no return in many ways. In addition to delineating which powers belonged to the 
subnational parliaments and to the national parliament, the issues raised by the lack of 
hierarchy among the governmental bodies came to the forefront. As all the regional and 
community parliaments have the same level of authority as the federal parliament and 
their laws are treated with the same weight, the supremacy of the national government in 
certain areas, specifically foreign policy was called into question. While that reform itself 
decided to ignore that problem, the discussion of devolving foreign policy was both 
radical and an example of the vast responsibilities that the subnational state reasonably 
argued it had a right to control. The direct election of the subnational parliaments freed 
them of their direct tie to the national parliament and removed the association of regional 
MPs with those of the other region or community. When the politicians served at both the 
national and subnational level, they were accustomed to working with both 
ethnolinguistic groups to create policies for the nation in addition to their subnational 
role. With the direct election, this was removed as separate politicians serve in the 
subnational and national parliaments. For these MPs, this reinforces their ties to their 
Region and Community over the nation rather than the two complementing each other. 
The chasm between the two ethnolinguistic groups only deepened with this and it 
continues to widen. Despite this, it is possible that the newest reform to the Senate has the 
potential to re-establish some of these linkages as it will provide the members of the 
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subnational parliament with increased interaction with those of other Regions and 
Communities.  
 Almost twenty years after the federalization of Belgium, the N-VA emerged as 
the largest party in Flanders. In discussing the party’s success, De Wever turned directly 
to the country’s institutional structure, claiming that it had established two separate 
democracies in one country.113 While that is perhaps an oversimplification given that 
there are truly four separate electorates, plus the complex situation of Brussels and its 
suburbs, the idea of two separate democracies coexisting in Belgium encapsulates the 
separate party systems and the general trend of the country that has created an underlying 
notion that Belgium is already two separate countries that are simply continuing to ignore 
that reality.  
The division of the ethnolinguistic groups at the government institutional level 
has guided the overall media culture of the country. With the initial language laws 
enforcing monolingualism within the two main regions, bilingualism was driven out and 
francophone media in Flanders mostly ceased to exist.114 This has become even more 
evident since the communities received their own cultural competences, as each language 
group has its own monolingual broadcasting network.115 In addition, the information 
provided by these media mostly concerns the Region to which that linguistic community 
belongs which does nothing to address the limited amount of interaction the average 
Fleming has with Walloon culture and vice versa. Occasionally, the television and radio 
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stations will have programming specifically discussing the culture of the other half, such 
as De Andere Belgen (the Other Belgians) which sought to give Flemish viewers a look at 
francophone Belgians, but the existence of such programming indicates the disconnect 
between the two groups.116 
This drifting apart at a societal level further shifts the self-construction of identity 
for citizens. With news continually discussing Wallonia and mostly ignoring the other 
half of the country, Flanders become increasingly distant in the minds of Walloons. The 
linguistic division of the parties further removes the two groups from each other. In 
addition, with the majority of cultural powers that are used to instill a common identity, 
most notably education, at the subnational level, the national government has no real 
means of promoting a Belgian identity. Thus, neither the national government nor the 
media can successively counteract the deficiencies of the other and create or promote a 
national identity. Instead, they both serve to emphasize the subnational. 
The latest reform demonstrated the hallmark result of a stronger subnational 
legitimacy relative to that of the national government in its decentralization of resources. 
Beyond the changes of the reform that were discussed in chapter 3, the actual shift in 
subnational government expenditures both overall and as a percentage of total 
governmental expenditures demonstrate this gain of the subnational governments, 
specifically the Regions relative to the national government. This can be seen in Figure 
4.3 and Figure 4.4, which depict the increased expenditures of the subnational 
governments over time. The key year for this newest shift is 2015, the first year after they 
gained their increased fiscal powers. As Figure 4.4 presents, this increase in 2015 
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occurred at a point in which total government expenditure stayed at a comparable level to 
the previous year as the increase of the subnational expenditure was roughly matched by 
a decrease in spending at the national level. Part of this increased expenditure is derived 
from funds obtained from their newly acquired taxation powers, and thus is not directly a 
transfer of money from the national to the subnational; however, the improved fiscal 
autonomy obtained as a result of their ability to tax does result in a reduction of authority 
of the national government over the Regions. As a result, while it is not a devolution of 
resources, it nevertheless represents a decentralization of them. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Source: International Monetary Fund. “Government Finance Statistics (GFS).” International Monetary 
Fund, http://data.imf.org/?sk=a0867067-d23c-4ebc-ad23-d3b015045405&sId=1409151240976 (accessed November 
10, 2018). 
In line with the model proposed by Rodríguez-Pose Gill, the decentralization in 
Belgium promulgated by the state reforms originated with the type expected with a strong 
national legitimacy in relation to that of the subnational. However, in the most recent 
reforms, this has shifted towards a decentralization of resources, indicating that the 
subnational legitimacy has increased, and perhaps overtaken, the legitimacy of the federal 
government. This move towards greater regional legitimacy has coincided with the 
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resurgence of regionalist parties, specifically the meteoric rise of the N-VA. For a party 
which advocates for a confederal Belgium and, eventually, an independent Flanders, 
legitimizing the Regions over the country provides greater credence to feasibility and 
appeal of their aims.  
 
Figure 4.4 - Source: International Monetary Fund. “Government Finance Statistics (GFS).” International Monetary 
Fund, http://data.imf.org/?sk=a0867067-d23c-4ebc-ad23-d3b015045405&sId=1409151240976 (accessed November 
10, 2018 
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CHAPTER 5: SHIFTING INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL PARTIES 
 The underlying idea of consociationalism is the belief that the elites that rise to 
power through the political parties will not be the very radicals that undermine the 
stability of democracy in a plural society. Instead, the leaders are supposed to be 
moderates, or at least willing to accommodate. It fundamentally hinges on those who 
govern being less radical than the average member of their segment and the population at 
large. An initial problem for consociationalism is that it lacks a mechanism to guarantee 
this, and its insistence on all segments of the population receiving representation 
undermines its ability to elevate moderates, particularly in the cases where one of the 
significant segments of the population is comprised mostly of radicals. Furthermore, in 
the event that radicals do come to power, consociationalism relies only on norms to hope 
that such elected officials will decide to compromise and work within the structure rather 
than against it. If they simply refuse to compromise, a consociational system becomes 
stagnant, which would likely only increase tensions and the segmental tendencies that it 
aims to mitigates. In fact, as a consociational system requires the inclusion of all major 
segments of the population, it will likely lead to the inclusion of some extremists in 
power with the belief that providing an avenue to achieve some gains in the system will 
encourage them to support it and turn towards moderation. Once in power, those radicals 
are constrained by the power-sharing structure and mutual vetoes, but there is nothing to 
stop them from refusing to cooperate with other parties and stoking segmentalism for 
their own political benefit. In that case, it is unlikely that consociationalism will 
successfully stabilize a country’s political system. 
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 Belgium, with its relatively peaceful history despite its ethnolinguistic divisions, 
historically demonstrated the stability that was possible with mostly moderates in power. 
When the more radical individuals began to challenge the power of the traditional parties, 
the country’s leaders followed the consociational path of accommodating the wishes of 
the regionalists in the state reforms without allowing extremists into power. In doing so, 
the electoral success of the regionalist parties began to fade, and the traditional parties 
began to once again consolidate power. However, as the rise of the N-VA has 
demonstrated, this return to historical norms was short-lived and radicals play an 
increasingly larger role in the Belgian government. The difficulty faced by politicians in 
forming a governing coalition following the 2007 and 2010 elections demonstrates a 
reduction in the ability of the elites to work together and compromise. Thus, the 
consociational ideal has seemingly been lost in Belgium in the years following its 
federalization. 
 Different ideas have been proposed as explanations for this phenomenon. Some 
point to socioeconomic factors such as increasingly diverging opinions between the 
average Walloon and Fleming and the continued economic strength of Flanders in 
comparison to Wallonia. The basis for this argument rests on the idea that, as the 
socioeconomic situation within the two regions differs, the positions of the political 
parties naturally reflect this divide and, as the gap widens, finding a suitable solution for 
representatives for both sides becomes increasingly difficult.117 This proposal has 
weaknesses on both the social and economic halves of the argument, as they fail to 
account for the depth of the political dilemma in which Belgium currently finds itself. 
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First, the evidence for the existence of voter disparity is inconclusive. While a 
greater percentage of Flemish voters prefer further devolution than Walloon voters, the 
difference is not as great as the divides between the Flemish and Walloon parties would 
suggest. In a 2009 survey, participants were asked to place themselves on a scale of 0 to 
10, where 0 represented giving all powers to the sub-states and 10 represented giving all 
powers to the federal state.118 The average response from Flemish voters was 4.3 versus 
5.1 among Walloons, demonstrating that voters in the two Regions do differ on their 
desire for federalism, but not by an insurmountable amount.119 This issue of identity 
presents a convergence among Flemish and French speakers as well. A 2014 survey 
found that, when asked to rank the territorial/communal entities with which they identify, 
the majority in both groups of respondents selected Belgium.120 This identification was 
chosen by about half of the Flemings surveyed and around sixty percent of the 
Walloons.121 Furthermore, when members of the two language communities are brought 
together in focus groups, they are able to reach agreements and hostile attitudes are 
lessened.122 Thus, differences between the groups on the issue of state reform do exist 
and could influence the parties but, at the individual level, it does not appear to be so 
great as to prevent accommodation and to push radicalization. 
 The issue of the economic supremacy of Flanders over Wallonia certainly 
influences the political leaders of the country and has historically played a role in the 
regionalist movement as discussed in Chapter 3. An important element of the most recent 
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constitutional reform sought to address the transfer of funds from Flanders to Wallonia, 
which had been heavily criticized by the N-VA.123 The overall timeline of the shift of 
economic prosperity from Wallonia to Flanders, however, does not correspond to the rise 
of the N-VA and the increased instability of the Belgian political system. These events 
have followed the federalization in 1993, with the N-VA’s electoral success beginning in 
2007, while the economic disparity dates to the 1960s. As a result, if the economic issues 
alone drove the push for regionalism, it seems unlikely that the regionalist parties would 
have faded from prominence only to return years later while the economic relation 
between Flanders and Wallonia remained relatively constant. Thus, while one cannot 
disregard the socioeconomic differences between the two halves of Belgium, claiming 
this divide can solely explain the current political situation is to overstress their 
importance. Instead, it is necessary to look at the institutional pressures placed on the 
political parties following the federalization of the country in 1993.  
 The design of the federal system in Belgium was heavily influenced by 
disagreements among Francophone and Flemish politicians over the structure of the 
subnational units. Francophones preferred a regional distinction while Flemings argued 
for separation on the basis of communities.124 For Francophones, the benefit of a 
regional-based divide is clear as it provided them a numerical advantage over the Flemish 
with the two mostly Francophone regions of Wallonia and Brussels versus the singular 
Flemish one of Flanders. For the Flemish, a division between language communities 
would create a one-to-one conflict, which, due to the greater numbers of Dutch speakers 
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than French speakers, would provide them with a numerical advantage. So, in order to 
accommodate both of these positions, this dual-system of both Regions and Communities 
was created. This has created an asymmetric system with few subnational units. The 
limited number of Regions and Communities was not an inevitable result since, prior to 
the reforms and still to this day, Belgium has several provinces, some of which crossed 
linguistic boundaries until the official federalization in 1993.125 However, as the regional 
movements had dedicated significant effort to building a subnational identity tied to the 
ideas of Flanders and Wallonia rather than the Dutch- or French-speaking provinces, 
national rhetoric had shifted towards these larger units, leading to the federalization along 
Flanders versus Wallonia lines.  
 This bipolar arrangement is one of the more problematic aspects of the federal 
state. It has institutionalized the idea of ‘us versus them’ and has clearly defined which 
groups fall under the ‘us’ and who represents the ‘them’. In conflicts that pit the Regions 
or Communities against each other, it is always the same players as there are no 
alternatives between Flanders versus Wallonia or Dutch versus French within the 
country. This makes the system more unstable than if it had several subnational units. In 
such a system, the sides in disputes would likely vary rather than remaining stable over 
time. With more players, hostilities may be lower as an opponent in one dispute may be 
an ally on another. Under the Belgian system, there is no such incentive as the sides never 
change. Instead, politicians are forced to operate in a zero-sum mindset, where any gain 
by the other side provides no benefits for them and, in fact, may weaken their ability to 
obtain victory in other areas. The existence of the Brussels Capital Region does alleviate 
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some of the pressures placed by this bipolar structure as it provides a linkage between the 
other two Regions, though even the politicians within that Region belong to one of the 
two language groups. 
Furthermore, the electoral system provides incentives for more radical actors and 
discourages compromise. The mechanisms for this are twofold: first, the division of the 
electorate on the basis of language, and second, the mismatch in timing of the federal and 
regional elections during a period in which the subnational entities continue to gain 
increased powers. Together, these elements have reduced the benefits of holding a 
moderate position while simultaneously encouraging hardline stances. 
Within Belgium, there are four separate electorates: the German-speaking 
electorate, the Dutch-speaking electorate of Flanders, the French-speaking electorate of 
Wallonia, and the bilingual Brussels electorate. These electorates, with the exception of 
Brussels, have created monolingual electoral systems within a bilingual country. Even in 
Brussels and the Halle-Vilvoorde municipalities with special facilities, voters are 
required to choose to vote either from the French lists or from the Dutch ones.126 As a 
result, politicians are only held accountable to members of their own language 
community. This removes some of the consequences of taking radical stances in regard to 
regionalist rhetoric. Without having to worry about gathering votes in Wallonia, Flemish 
parties can solely focus on policies in the best interest of Flanders and disregard the 
effects they may have on Wallonia. The incentive to focus on the best interests of 
Belgium as a whole is limited since they are accountable not to Belgians, but to Flemings 
or Walloons.  
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This issue is further complicated by the timing of the elections. Following the 
federalization and the direct election of the regional parliaments, the political parties 
gained another important election in which they needed to succeed. The prominence of 
the regional parliaments has only grown over time with their increased powers and the 
same parties compete against each other at both levels. For this reason, the occurrence of 
the federal and regional elections in different years, particularly the regional elections 
occurring in the year after the federal elections, has caused a predicament for those 
elected to the federal parliament that could be clearly seen in the struggles to form 
governing coalitions following the 2007 and 2010 federal elections.  
 
5.1 The 2007 Federal Election and Coalition Formation 
 The 2007 federal election marked the second time where the federal and regional 
elections occurred in separate years. The previous instance, the 2003 federal election and 
2004 regional election, had, in many ways, laid the groundwork for the six-month-long 
coalition formation discussion that followed the 2007 election. In 2003, the Flemish 
Christian Democrats (CD&V) experienced their second major election defeat in a row. 
The party, historically the strongest in Flanders, both prior to the party split along 
linguistic lines and afterward, watched as its longtime rivals obtained a larger vote 
share.127 With the regional elections occurring in 2004, the party decided to seize on an 
opportunity to attempt to reduce this slide and return to public favor by partnering with 
another party looking to strengthen their electoral platform, the N-VA.128 This electoral 
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alliance led to their victory in the 2004 regional election. In the process, members of both 
parties took strong regional stances, including maintaining that they would not join the 
regional governing coalition unless efforts began to split the controversial Brussels-Halle-
Vilvoorde (BHV) electoral district.129 The regional parliament to which they were elected 
had no ability to take such a measure, but they succeeded in convincing the Flemish 
Liberals (OpenVLD) and Socialists (sp.a), who were a part of the federal government, to 
agree to these terms.130 The actual split did not occur until later, which allowed the 
CD&V–N-VA alliance to campaign in the 2007 federal elections with the message that 
sp.a and OpenVLD had failed to keep their promises and caved to the Francophone 
parties. Furthermore, they utilized the rhetoric of successful governing at the regional 
level in comparison to incompetence or bad governance at the federal level.131  
Thus, when the CD&V–N-VA alliance gathered the largest vote share in the 2007 
election, they had already partially tied their hands as to the amount they were able to 
compromise. The results of the election had demonstrated the costs of failing to maintain 
promises of state reform and the potency of the narrative of better governance at the 
regional level. Now, as the leading Flemish party at the federal level, it would be 
considerably difficult to use the regional versus federal governing competency argument 
if they chose to participate in the federal coalition, but once in power, they needed to 
deliver on their promises to which the Francophone parties were in strong opposition.  
The coalition formation process was doomed from the start to be long and 
tenuous. The Belgian constitution requires that the federal government must include both 
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Francophone and Flemish parties as there must be an equal number of French- and 
Dutch-speaking ministers. This arrangement is a key aspect of consociationalism as it 
prevents either group from being locked out of power, but it posed a difficult barrier to 
surmount when the parties on each side of linguistic divide take positions that are 
incompatible. In this case, it was the divide of the BHV electoral district and greater 
fiscal autonomy to the Regions as the major Flemish parties had campaigned on fulfilling 
while the Francophone parties had campaigned on resisting any Flemish push for further 
devolution.132 The Francophone parties feared compromising with the Flemish parties 
after witnessing the results of the 2007 election, as joining alongside with the CD&V–N-
VA coalition would risk losing votes in the 2009 regional election to whichever party 
refused to cave and remained in the opposition. After six months of failed negotiations, 
the leader of the CD&V who was in charge of forming the government resigned and the 
previous prime minister was tasked with putting together a temporary cabinet that was to 
govern until the next federal election.133 This cabinet included members from all of the 
three traditional parties except for the sp.a, and failed to agree on pursuing state reform. 
As a result, fifteen months after the initial election, the disgruntled N-VA broke from 
their alliance with the CD&V and entered the opposition.134  
 
5.2 The 2010 Federal Election and Coalition Formation  
 The refusal of the N-VA to compromise on state reform allowed them to enter the 
campaign for the 2009 regional elections as the sole party that had not compromised on 
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state reform. OpenVLD had once again participated in the federal government and failed 
to deliver on state reform. Sp.a had caved previously, and the CD&V remained in the 
government despite their inability to persuade the Francophone parties. While the CD&V 
managed to retain the largest vote share in the 2009 regional election, the rise of the N-
VA was apparent as they obtained sixteen seats.135 For the Liberals, the decline continued 
with a loss of four additional seats.136 Perhaps the CD&V was able to avoid the fallout 
experienced by sp.a and OpenVLD from the 2004 regional election to the 2007 federal 
election due to successful governance at the regional level; however, this did not transfer 
to the 2010 federal election where the N-VA received the largest vote share of any party 
in Belgium. 
 Given their previous experience, the N-VA could (and did), rightly or wrongly, 
attribute their success due to a refusal to compromise.137 Thus, they entered the 
government formation process determined to implement the state reforms they believed 
were long overdue. On the Francophone side, the Socialists (PS) received the largest 
share of votes and, not only had they taken a strong stance against the desired reforms of 
the N-VA, but they also were on the opposite side of the left-right political divide as the 
N-VA. For PS, who had retaken superiority over the Francophone Liberals (MR), this 
was particularly precarious as they had branded themselves as the strongest opponent to 
the Flemish regionalists. As a result, they were incentivized to avoid compromising as 
long as possible.  
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 Eventually, 541 days after the election, a coalition was formed among the 
traditional parties from both sides of the linguistic divide, leaving the N-VA in the 
opposition, and the sixth major state reform passed.138 While the ultimate agreement 
served as an important affirmation of the ability of the Belgian federal structure to 
accommodate, it also highlighted several weaknesses of the system. First, the federal 
election was not due until 2011, but the failure to form a government following the 2007 
election had left the federal parliament in an unstable position. In fact, there were three 
different governments led by the CD&V between 2007 and 2010: the first falling apart 
after the N-VA quit the government, the second lost their prime minister with his 
appointment to the presidency of the EU, and the third marked the collapse of the 
government with the Flemish Liberals exiting the coalition.139 With the fall of the third 
CD&V government, the leaders had no choice but to call for elections a year early. Thus, 
this compromise came only after another government had collapsed as a result of a failure 
to find a compromise. Even with this history, the newly elected government still needed 
almost eighteen months to accommodate the wishes of the two sides.  
 Secondly, due to the amount of time it took, it demonstrated the lack of pressure 
on the federal government to function. Had the politicians faced serious repercussions for 
delaying the formation process, they may have been incentivized to work together to 
achieve a suitable solution. The absence of pressure came from both the system and the 
general public. On the part of the populace, there was a general indifference to the lack of 
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government. They did not mobilize in any organized fashion, particularly as they saw no 
real impact on their daily lives.140  
Their passivity can be partially explained by the framework of the country. The 
Belgian constitution provides for a caretaker government to run the country in the 
absence of a federal coalition. This caretaker government is composed of the ministers 
from the previous government and remains in place until the King officially appoints the 
new ministers who were selected from the coalition formation process.141 These ministers 
carry out the implementation of policies agreed upon prior to the election and attempt to 
ensure stability at the national and international level.142 Furthermore, with the number of 
powers given to the subnational parliaments and the number of subnational parliaments, 
the strain on the federal government has been lessened. Thus, the absence of a full-
strength federal parliament does not have the same weight as it would prior to the 
federalization of Belgium. The role of the national government in the daily lives of the 
average Belgian has been reduced with the devolution of powers and its year-long 
absence was hardly felt at the individual level as a result. This structure provides little 
incentive to the parties to form a government if doing so would require a compromise of 
the positions on which they ran, particularly for the Flemish parties who push for 
confederalism. In fact, the longer the federal government fails to function, the more 
credence they gain in their claims that the Regions are more productive and the place of 
good governance. They can discredit the federal government and point to the obstinance 
of those from the other Region(s). 
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The response of the political parties to the federalization of Belgium has 
demonstrated the way in which consociationalism has been undermined by this process. 
Moderation and accommodation have been replaced by moves towards extremes, even 
beyond the positions of the average citizens, and a reluctance or outright refusal to 
compromise. This latter issue can best be seen in the difficult government formation 
process following the 2007 and 2010 elections. Even though the 2014 election fared 
better in this regard, it resulted in a coalition that included only one Francophone party, 
leaving the federal government heavily lopsided towards Flanders and the Flemish, 
hardly the power-sharing ideal sought by consociationalism. 
 
5.3 The ‘De Wever’ Effect  
It should be noted that the success of the N-VA has other possible causes beyond 
the effects of the reforms combined with consociationalism. Given this uniqueness of the 
N-VA, these other explanations look directly at the characteristics that set it apart from 
the other parties that had slowly lost their basis of support. One such reason includes the 
charismatic appeal of the party’s chairman, Bart De Wever. This personality aspect likely 
does influence voters, particularly given the entrenchment of a regional-based identity 
and De Wever’s ability to operate as a prototypical representative of Flemings. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, a leader who represents a prototypical group member benefits 
from increased influence when that group identity is highly salient as they are associated 
with group ideals and values in a way that a less prototypical individual is not and, as a 
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result, that leader can better persuade people to their side on the notion that their personal 
beliefs mirror those of the group.143  
As it pertains to prototypicality, it matters less whether or not De Wever properly 
represents the standard Flemings as the important element is the perception of him as 
such. De Wever became a well-known public figure due to his participation in 2009 on a 
Flemish quiz show called De Slimste Mens ter Wereld [The Smartest Person in the 
World] where he reached an audience of almost two million people during each of his ten 
appearances.144 Through this show, he was able to present himself as a relatable 
individual who spoke the language of the average Flemings.145 By this point, De Wever 
was an established politician, having already led the N-VA for five years and been 
elected to the Flemish Parliament in 2004, though he was hardly the major political figure 
that he would become following the 2010 election. A survey of public perception of 
politicians following De Wever’s participation on the show revealed that almost half of 
the people questioned saw him as steadfast and straightforward, capable of leading 
Flanders, and someone with whom one would want to share a drink.146 These 
appearances allowed him to appeal to a broader base beyond those typically in the 
Flemish nationalist camp, yet the publicity alone cannot account for his appeal, as other 
politicians who participated on De Slimste Mens failed to garner the same increased 
popularity.  
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De Wever succeeded where others had failed by casting himself as the youthful, 
humorous politician who understood Flemings and could combat the inefficiency of the 
national system. He was someone they could trust to fight for their interests and proposed 
a Flemish nationalism that sought power for Flanders on the basis that the economic 
disaster faced by Belgium originated from the failures of the Walloons. Having received 
almost 800,000 preferential votes in the 2010 election, De Wever emerged as the most 
popular politician in Belgium.147  
Despite this personal success and the emergence of the N-VA as the largest 
political party in Belgium, De Wever did not participate in the federal government 
following that election. Instead, his party was in the opposition, and in 2012, he opted to 
run for mayor of Antwerp rather than remain at the federal level. Furthermore, when the 
N-VA formed a government with the Mouvement Réformateur (MR), CD&V, and the 
OpenVLD following the 2014 federal election, De Wever promoted other members of his 
party to serve as federal ministers rather than serving as one himself. This has had two 
major effects. First, it protects his image from the negativity associated with the federal 
government. National politicians in Belgium often are seen as self-interested, money-
hungry, and untrustworthy. By staying away from this spotlight, De Wever seems pure 
due to his refusal to seek the greatest power available to him. Additionally, his position as 
mayor of Antwerp continues to emphasize that he considers the smaller elements of the 
government to be important rather than indirectly providing legitimacy to the national 
government with his participation. If he questions why a Flemish voter would even want 
to contribute to the Belgian state and calls for Belgium to “evaporate” but at the same 
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time serves as a minister in the federal government, he loses some credibility and his 
status as someone who can be trusted since such a move would appear inconsistent.148 
The second effect of his promotion of other party members to the federal platform while 
remaining local himself is that it expands the party beyond him and reduces the 
dependence the party has on his personal image. This effort has been successful, as Theo 
Francken, a member of the N-VA who served as a state secretary in the federal 
government until the N-VA quit the government in December 2018, has overtaken De 
Wever as the most popular politician among Flemings as of June 2018.149 De Wever 
remains a visible and boisterous face of the N-VA, but he is now one of many. For this 
reason, it will become increasingly difficult to argue that the success of the N-VA hinges 
on the appeal of De Wever. 
While it is difficult, if not impossible, to completely discount the effect that De 
Wever has likely had in the success of the N-VA, there are several reasons to believe that 
his charismatic appeal alone cannot account for the growth of the party to be the largest 
in Belgium. First, the N-VA has succeeded even without De Wever on the ballot as 
evidenced by their success in the 2012 provincial elections where the party won three of 
the five provinces.150 While they fared best in Antwerp, where De Wever ran for mayor, 
the ability to succeed in those other areas demonstrated that, even prior to the massive 
success of the 2014 election, the party had gained support that was not solely tied to the 
                                                 
148 Gijs Moes, “‘Laat België maar rustig verdampen’” (‘Let Belgium Slowly Evaporate’), Trouw De 
Verdieping, April 8, 2010. 
149 Courrier International, “La N-VA quitte le gouvernement Michel, désormais minoritaire” (The N-VA 
leaves the Michel government, henceforth in minority), December 10, 2018; David Coppi, Ann-Charlotte 
Bersipont and Bernand Demonty. “Grand Baromètre : trou d’air pour la N-VA, qui chute de 4,8%” (Great 
Barometer : Air Hole for the N-VA, who falls 4.8%). Le Soir, June 8, 2018.  
150 Flemish Government, “Verkiezingen 2012: Provincie” (Elections 2012: Province), https://www. 
vlaanderenkiest.be/verkiezingen2012/#/provincie/70000/p_-2/uitslagen (Accessed November 7, 2018).  
69 
 
prospects of De Wever in power. Additionally, his refusal to seek the prime ministership 
makes it difficult to argue that Flemings continue to vote for the N-VA because they want 
him in power rather than the party in general.  
Most importantly, the divided nature of the Belgian electorate has played a 
valuable role in the ‘De Wever effect’. Despite his former status as the most popular 
politician, he is summarily disliked in Wallonia and among many Bruxellois in general 
who characterized him as a “Flemish Milošević”.151 His polarizing nature does not 
damage him when he never has to face his harshest critics. This same effect extends to 
the N-VA as a whole, since the party does not have to try to court Francophones or even 
worry about their votes. Thanks to the separate electorates, the first time that newly 
elected politicians from the two language communities come into contact is when the 
process to form the new government begins. It is the consequences tied to this and the 
other aspects of the reforms that have benefitted the rise of the N-VA as they created the 
institutional framework within which the N-VA has succeeded.  
  
                                                 
151 Rochtus, “The Rebirth of Flemish Nationalism,” 280.  
70 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper has attempted to analyze the resurgence of regionalism in Belgium 
despite the efforts taken over the past half-century to mitigate this tendency. While the 
reforms along with the linguistic separation of the parties initially reduced the support for 
the regionalist parties, it did little to reduce the overall role of regionalism in the political 
sphere. Instead, the party with the greatest electoral support advocates for a path towards 
independence for Flanders and other Flemish parties push for confederalism.  
 My hypothesis was that this continued importance of regionalism was intrinsically 
linked with the institutional structure created in Belgium by the reforms themselves, 
particularly the process of federalization itself. This argument was selected due to the 
way in which the reforms solidified the notion of subnational identities within Belgium 
and changed the incentives for the political parties. My analysis found that the reforms 
have led the parties towards extremism by granting greater weight to the regionalist voter 
and increasing the consequences for compromise. Rather than drawing attention away 
from the ethnolinguistic divisions, the reforms have solidified their importance. 
Furthermore, the latest reforms have highlighted the growth in the legitimacy of the 
subnational government over that of the national.  
 This paper thus supports the critiques of consociationalism as implementing 
institutions that undermine its own goals. While Belgium has avoided the political 
violence that often plagues plural societies, it is still wrought with instability and calls for 
separatism. As a result, it appears that consociationalism is limited in its ability to address 
the difficulties in creating a suitable institutional structure for democracies in plural 
societies. The design’s dependence on moderate elites while failing to incentivize those 
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very elites towards moderate positions limits its functionality whenever the elites find 
extremism to be politically advantageous. Furthermore, in the Belgian case, it is the 
compromises reached as a result of consociationalism that have furthered the turn 
towards regionalism. 
 As this paper focuses on the Belgian case, the general applicability of its findings 
on consociationalism in plural societies is limited. The dynamics within Belgium with the 
subnational identities growing from political dissidents over time rather than predating 
the country itself demonstrates that the country has been slowly drifting away from the 
center rather than towards it for a significant period of time. Consociationalism has failed 
to reverse or to even stop this tendency. It is possible that the particular issue for the 
Belgian state is the bipolar nature of its divide as it provides the parties on either 
ethnolinguistic side with a clear opponent. Furthermore, the greatest benefit of 
consociationalism may lie in its ability to reduce violence in plural societies, and thus the 
consequences of its centrifugal tendencies may be an acceptable trade-off for societies 
plagued with these conflicts. The Belgian case cannot address this issue as it has 
managed to avoid political violence, perhaps due to its use of consociationalism. In fact, 
the relative peace in the country, despite the strength of Flemish nationalism, may result 
from consociationalism allowing such representation, even if such positions are deemed 
undesirable by the institutional structure itself, unlike centripetalism which would prevent 
the existence of the N-VA altogether. Thus, this paper cannot provide a determination on 
whether or not consociationalism is a suitable political structure for plural societies. 
Instead, it calls for careful consideration of its limitations.   
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 For those pluralistic countries seeking a way to avoid the pitfalls of the ethnic 
outbidding common in diverse democracies, the problems faced by Belgium provide a 
warning of the potential consequences in implementing a consociational structure. The 
lack of mechanisms in place to combat extremism beyond relying on institutional norms 
can prove fatal if those in leadership decide that those norms are no longer politically 
advantageous. In the electoral model of Belgium where the majority of the electorate is 
divided based on ethnolinguistic identity, parties face a greater incentive to appeal on 
these identities rather than those of the broader country, especially if they are confronted 
with a segmental party that manages to erode their electoral support. While 
consociationalism may reduce violent tendencies among segmentalist groups, it does not 
guarantee the long-term political stability and unity of a country. In fact, for countries 
that begin with a strong national government, implementing the segmental autonomy of 
consociationalism can strengthen the legitimacy of the subnational unit. Federalism thus 
may serve as only a temporary salve for such societies if one implements a consociational 
structure. 
 However, this should not discount the benefits of a federalist structure as it 
provides methods of self-governance and reduces the number of points of conflict 
between different subnational groups. Federalism serves as one of the few systemic 
commonalities between consociationalism and centripetalism due to these factors. 
Perhaps, under a centripetal system, the turn to federalism would not have reinvigorated 
regionalism within Belgium, though this is contentious itself. After all, one of the major 
prescriptions of centripetalism would have been the creation of national parties, which 
were the very types of parties that began the process of the reforms. The Belgian parties 
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found it advantageous to split into their ethnolinguistic camps rather than remain united. 
While a centripetal system would forbid the parties from competing solely within one 
group, leaders within the country may simply abandon these rules when they too find it 
beneficial to do so. Thus, perhaps, as long as politicians believe pitting groups against 
each other will lead to greater political success than appealing to the voters at the national 
level, it will be difficult to eliminate the role of segmentalists in politics.  
 The case of Belgium continues the general pessimism that accompanies forecasts 
for stable, functional democracy in plural societies, though it does contradict those who 
argue that peaceful democracies are impossible for such societies. The continued 
presence of regionalists in the absence of political violence should provide a certain level 
of hope to those seeking an institutional model for their plural democracy. It is important 
for those leaders to note the dilemmas faced by Belgian politicians and to exercise 
caution if they hope to reduce the process of ethnic outbidding. It may be beneficial for 
them to implement a mix of the policies proposed by consociationalism and 
centripetalism to encourage politicians to work across their subnational lines and 
compromise. 
 It is perhaps ironic, in light of the division presented in this paper, that the motto 
of Belgium reads “unity makes strength.” However, despite the half-century of 
devolutionary reforms, the Regions and Communities of Belgium remained united. There 
are a few possible reasons for this, such as the importance of Brussels, both as the 
country’s capital and as the de facto capital of the European Union, and the slow-moving 
nature of the consociational institutional structure. Most important, though, is that most 
Belgians desire for their country to remain whole. Around 80% of Walloons and residents 
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of Brussels and 54% of Flemings prefer a unified Belgium to independence for Wallonia, 
Flanders, and Brussels.152 It seems unlikely, as long as the majority of Belgians oppose 
splitting up their country, that the N-VA will achieve its aim of an independent Flanders.   
Will regionalism continue to plague Belgium? If the model proposed by 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003) is any guide, it seems unlikely that the national 
government will be able to reverse this trajectory, particularly as it has lost primary 
legitimacy to the regional, at least in the minds of politicians. 2019 marks the next round 
of the federal and regional elections and polls continue to point to the N-VA maintaining 
its position as the largest party in the country. Barring any major efforts on the Flemish 
side to restore the importance of Belgium, it seems unlikely that institutional problems 
shown in this paper will simply disappear. Perhaps, with enough time, the role of 
regionalism will diminish, as Belgium remains a young federation. However, as long as 
the parties fear losing the regionalist voter, they will lack the political incentive to move 
towards the center. In this divided system without any national voters, it seems unlikely 
that parties will decide to pursue a position at the center of national, rather than regional, 
public opinion. As long as this remains the case, the continued divisions between the 
Flemish and Walloon voters will discourage the parties from looking beyond the 
ethnolinguistic divide.  
   
    
                                                 
152 Bol, Damien, et al., 2017, “MEDW 2014 Belgian National Election Study,” https://doi.org/10.7910/ 
DVN/7GA3IT , Harvard Dataverse, V1. 
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Appendix A: Map of Belgium 
 
  
FLANDERS 
WALLONIA 
BRUSSELS-
CAPITOL 
REGION  
GERMAN-
SPEAKING 
COMMUNIT
Y 
(Pa
rt of 
Wal
loni
a) 
CAPITAL REGION  
GERMAN-SPEAKING COMMUNITY 
(Part of Wallonia) 
84 
 
Appendix B: Theoretical Framework of Devolution 
 
Note: Doubled-lined boxes and arrows indicate initial factors and processes, respectively; 
single-lined boxes and arrows indicate subsequent factors and processes, respectively. 
 
Source: Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Nicholas Gill, “The Global Trend towards 
Devolution and its Implications,” Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 21, 
no. 3 (June 2002), 335. 
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Appendix C: Structure of Belgian Government 
 
Note: Members of the regional and community parliaments make up the Senate, which is not directly elected. The other parliaments 
are directly elected. Dutch-speaking members of the Brussels Parliament also serve in the Flemish Parliament; French-speaking 
members serve in the French-Speaking Community. Members of the Wallonia Parliament also serve in French-speaking Parliament, 
excluding the two German-speaking members of the Parliament, who are replaced by French-speaking members of the same party. 
